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Many observers have argued that credit default swaps contributed significantly to the credit crisis.
Of particular concern to these observers are that credit default swaps trade in the largely unregulated
over-the-counter market as bilateral contracts involving counterparty risk and that they facilitate speculation
involving negative views of a firm’s financial strength. Some observers have suggested that credit
default swaps would not have made the crisis worse had they been traded on exchanges. I conclude
that credit default swaps did not cause the dramatic events of the credit crisis, that the over-the-counter
credit default swaps market worked well during much of the first year of the credit crisis, and that
exchange trading has both advantages and costs compared to over-the-counter trading. Though I argue
that eliminating over-the-counter trading of credit default swaps could reduce social welfare, I also
recognize that much research is needed to understand better and quantify the social gains and costs
of derivatives in general and credit default swaps in particular.
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In  the  banking  sector,  the  credit  crisis  has  brought  about  a  destruction  of  wealth  of  a 
magnitude that has not been seen since the Great Depression. In trying to understand why banks 
collapsed,  why  housing  prices  fell  so  dramatically,  and  why  the  credit  markets  froze,  many 
observers have identified credit default swaps to be a prominent villain. CBS called credit default 
swaps on subprime mortgages the “bet that blew up Wall Street”.
1 With Google, a search under 
“worst Wall Street invention” comes up with credit default swaps first. A hedge fund manager 
said that they are “the dark matter of the financial universe.”
2 George Soros, the hedge fund 
manager, and many others want most or all trading in credit default swaps to be banned. Some 
have argued that over-the-counter trading of credit default swaps should be eliminated but that 
exchange trading would be acceptable.  
  In their simplest form, credit default swaps are a straightforward type of financial derivative. 
They make a payment to the buyer, generally called the protection buyer, equal to losses on bonds 
or loans resulting from default (or, in some cases, a debt restructuring) by a company. The seller, 
usually named the protection seller, receives a periodic fee for agreeing to make these payments. 
A simple way to understand these contracts is that they are functionally equivalent to default 
insurance contracts. The insured event is the loss arising from a default; the premium paid is the 
fee; the policy limit, i.e., the maximum covered loss, is called the notional amount; in contrast to 
typical insurance policies, credit default swaps have no deductible. Importantly, however, one has 
to be exposed to a risk to obtain an insurance contract; for instance, to buy insurance on a house, 
one has to own the house; with credit derivatives, one can buy protection without being exposed 
to the risk that the protection insures.   
Of course, as with all derivatives, credit default swaps take many forms. Default swaps could 
be purchased to insure portfolios of subprime mortgages and, in securitizations, slices of such 
portfolios. Default swaps offering protection against defaults on portfolios of subprime mortgages 
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made it possible for investors to take exposure to subprime mortgages without taking positions in 
the  mortgages  themselves.  During  the  boom  that  preceded  the  credit  crisis,  the  demand  for 
exposure to subprime mortgages grew so quickly and so intensely that there were not enough 
subprime  mortgages  to  satisfy  that  demand.  Eventually,  investors  acquired  such  exposure 
synthetically through credit default swaps.  
Credit default swaps have both social benefits and social costs. The social benefits are that 
they make it easier for credit risks to be borne by those who are in the best position to bear them, 
that they enable financial institutions to make loans they would not otherwise be able to make, 
and that their trading reveals useful information about credit risk. These arguments for  credit 
derivatives are standard among economists. Among others, Alan Greenspan made them often. For 
instance,  in  2004,  while  still  chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  he  stated  that  credit 
derivatives and other complex financial instruments contributed  “to the development of a far 
more flexible, efficient, and hence resilient financial system than existed just a quarter-century 
ago.”
3 However, the fact that the credit crisis led him to conclude that the “whole intellectual 
edifice”  which  underlies  the  use  of  credit  derivatives  and  complex  financial  instruments 
“collapsed  in  the  summer  of  last  year”  because  of  risk  management  mistakes  offers  strong 
testimony that the costs associated with credit derivatives have to be taken as seriously as their 
benefits.
4    
There  are  fundamentally  three  reasons  why  observers  argue  that  credit  default  swaps 
contributed to the crisis and are dangerous. The first argument is that derivatives in general and 
credit default swaps in particular made possible the credit boom that ended in the  credit crisis. 
The second argument is that f inancial institutions  have  positions in credit default swaps for 
trillions of dollars of notional amount and that these positions have created systemic risk. These 
massive exposures are alleged by many to have ne cessitated the indirect bailout of Bear Stearns 
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by the Federal Reserve and to have led to the direct bailout of AIG at a cost to taxpayers of 
billions  of  dollars.  Further,  according  to  some  observers,  these  exposures  led  to  a  crisis  of 
confidence in financial institutions following the collapse of Lehman as market participants were 
left guessing how much banks might have to pay on credit default swaps. Lastly, observers argue 
that the lack of transparency of the credit default swap market has made it possible for market 
participants to manipulate that market, thereby making it appear that some financial institutions 
were  much  weaker  financially  than  they  actually  were  and  threatening  the  soundness  of  the 
financial system. Such manipulations are often argued to have been partly responsible for the fall 
of Bear Stearns and Lehman.  
Though many have argued that derivatives and especially credit defaults swaps should be 
banned, others have claimed that the problems caused by credit default swaps during the credit 
crisis  resulted  from  the  way  they  trade  and  from  the  fact  that  they  were  largely  free  from 
regulation. A common argument is that these derivatives should not trade over the counter as they 
do, but instead should trade on exchanges. Others have argued that requiring the trading of credit 
default swaps to have some features of exchange trading would be sufficient to eliminate much of 
the risk they might pose to the financial system.   
My focus in this paper is mostly on how the way credit default swaps trade contributed to the 
crisis and poses risks. I first review the mechanics of credit default swaps providing insurance 
against the default of individual companies before turning to the swaps used to take positions on 
subprime mortgages. I then examine the growth of the credit default swap market and provide 
data on the size of the market. I show that how credit default swaps are traded has created risks 
for the financial system and evaluate how these risks would have been different with exchange 
trading. Finally, I turn to the claims that these derivatives enabled investors to manipulate the 
value of financial institutions. I conclude with an assessment of the social costs and benefits of 
credit derivatives in light of the credit crisis.     
 5 
 
1.  Credit default swaps 
The best way to understand a plain vanilla credit default swap (CDS) is as an insurance 
contract against the cost of default of a company – the “name” or the “reference entity” in the 
language of the CDS market. Suppose that you hold Ford bonds and are concerned about Ford’s 
default risk. You could insure your  bond holdings with a  CDS. As with a typical insurance 
contract, you would pay premiums over time. If Ford does not default, you lose the premiums. If 
Ford defaults, the credit default swap allows you to exchange the Ford bonds you hold, which are 
now worth little, for the principal amount of the bonds, or alternatively, depending on the details 
of the contract, for a payment equal to the principal amount of the bonds you hold minus their 
current value at the time of default. By having taken a position in a CDS on Ford, you protected 
your investment against a Ford default. Your Ford bond could lose value even if Ford does not 
default, for instance if interest rates increase or Ford’s credit falls without a default, but in that 
case you would receive no payment from the Ford CDS.  
Despite all the suggestions that CDS are somehow nefarious, there is nothing particularly 
exotic about them. They are as easy to understand as insurance contracts - they are easier to price 
than some insurance contracts and harder than others. However, with some exceptions, insurance 
contracts do not trade. In contrast, CDS contracts trade over-the-counter. The market is a dealers’ 
market.  Dealers trade with end-users as well as with other dealers.  
You would not be alone in buying protection on Ford. The Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) keeps a trading information data warehouse that is freely accessible.
5 For 
the week ending on May 15, 2009, the DTCC had 5,387  contracts registered with it on Ford 
Motor Company, 1,583 on Ford Motor Credit Company, and 4,649 on Ford Motor Credit 
Company LLC. The total notional amount of CDS on Ford Motor Company was for $36 billion. 
For comparison, on December 31, 2008, the automo tive sector of Ford had total debt of $25.8 
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billion. It is not unusual for the total notional amount of CDS written on a name to exceed the 
total amount of debt issued by that name.  
There is also a large market for CDS indices, which are averages of credit-default swaps on 
different names. There are indices for corporates for Europe (iTraxx Europe), the U.S. (CDX 
North America), as well as other regions. To understand how these indices work, let’s consider 
the iTraxx Europe. The index represents a basket of 125 CDS referencing European investment 
grade credits. New series are introduced on March 20 and September 20 of each year. There also 
exist individualized (bespoke in the language of the industry) CDS contracts on baskets of names. 
Liquidity  is  generally  considered  to  be  a  measure  of  how  expensive  it  is  for  a  market 
participant to trade quickly (see Grossman and Miller (1997)). In an illiquid market, selling a 
position quickly is very expensive because the seller has to discount the price to attract buyers. 
Similarly, the buyer has to offer a substantial markup to attract sellers. In contrast, in a highly 
liquid  market,  one  can  buy  or  sell  quickly  without  having  to  pay  much  for  the  benefit  of 
immediacy. The CDS market for a name is often more liquid than the market for the name’s 
bonds, which makes the CDS market a better market to assess a company’s credit than the market 
for its bonds. There are at least three reasons for that. First, CDS are ideally suited to express 
credit views. Since they do not include funding, their price is typically less affected by liquidity 
considerations than the price of bonds.
6 Further, firms have all sorts of different bonds whose 
prices are affected by call provisions, covenants, coupon, maturity, liquidity, and so on; in 
contrast, CDS are like standardized bonds.  Second, CDS on a name can be used for hedging by 
investors who hold different bond issues – and also by companies that have receivables from that 
name or banks that made loans to it. This demand for CDS makes the market deeper. Finally, it is 
generally harder to go short in a company’s bonds or loans than it is to buy protection in the CDS 
market. Many economists would argue that the greater ability to go short means that the market 
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for CDS reacts more quickly to new information.
7 An empirical study of how information gets 
incorporated in bond prices and in CDS prices shows that information mostly flows from CDS 
prices to bond prices (Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) ). This greater efficiency of the CDS 
market in incorporating information benefits the pricing of all securities of a firm.  As we will 
discuss later, however, the ability to take short positions through the CDS market has led some to 
argue that this makes the CDS market destabilizing.   
In principle, CDS should make financial markets more efficient and improve the allocation of 
capital because they make it possible for credit risk to reside with the investors who are best 
equipped to bear it and introduce greater transparency in the pricing of credit. Hist orically, the 
investors who funded companies through debt had to bear the credit risk of these companies. 
Now, the investors who provide the capital need not be those who bear the credit risk, which can 
reduce the cost of capital for firms and make it easier for them to raise funds to take advantage of 
their growth opportunities.  
The separation of risk -bearing and funding made possible by credit derivatives  has  the 
potential to create problems in that lenders who fund companies but do not bear their risks  have 
less incentive to monitor their loans. Consider a bank that made a large loan to a firm. The market 
knows that the bank made the loan and believes that the other debt of the firm is safer because it 
expects the bank to monitor the loan carefully. Howe ver, if the bank has protected itself by 
buying protection, its incentives to monitor the loan may have  become less powerful – it would 
gain nothing from expending resources to discover problems at the firm since if the firm had 
problems that led it to default on its debt, the bank would receive the full principal amount of the 
loan, but from the seller of protection instead of from the firm. The seller of protection cannot 
monitor the firm in the same way as the bank would because it has no contractual relationship 
with the firm. As a result, the market’s assessment of the firm’s credit risk is based on the wrong 
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premise, namely that there is a bank monitoring the firm carefully, and, as a result, there may be 
too little monitoring of the firm. However, in practice, banks have many reasons to monitor their 
customers. Further, it may be expensive for them to buy protection because counterparties will 
assume that the bank is better informed than they are and will only trade at prices that protect 
them against making losses because of this information asymmetry.   
The ability of banks to hedge loans that they make also has benefits, however. For example, 
banks can keep lending to firms with which they have close relationships because they can limit 
their exposure to such firms through the use of CDS. As a result, firms can get more credit than 
they would otherwise receive and on better terms. Despite the advantages of CDS for banks, they 
have used them only to a limited extent to hedge loans. Few banks take positions in CDS and 
Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) show that the 23 U.S bank holding companies with CDS 
positions in 2005 hedged on average 2% of their loans with these instruments. Further, only 2% 
of the gross CDS positions of these banks were used for hedging – the other positions were held 
in their dealer business. In addition to the information asymmetry problem already discussed, 
another reason why banks’ use of CDS to hedge is limited is that, while the CDS market is 
typically quite liquid for large companies, it is usually not liquid for the smaller companies that 
banks make a lot of loans to. Interestingly, there was a sharp increase in net hedging in 2007.  
The  availability  of  CDS  contracts  can  change  the  incentives  of  investors.  Consider  an 
investor who holds bonds of a company in financial distress. This company may approach the 
investor to suggest a restructuring of its debt. The attitude of the investor towards the company’s 
proposal will depend on whether the investor hedged his position through a CDS or not.
8 Suppose 
the investor hedged his position through a CDS. Some CDS contracts treat a restructuring of debt 
as a credit event, i.e., an event that causes a payout,  while others do not.  In addition, however, 
even if the CDS treats a restructuring of debt as a credit event, not all restructurings qualify – an 
exchange of new bonds for the old ones would not qualify. If the investor has a CDS contract that 
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does not treat a restructuring as a credit event, he would receive nothing from the CDS when he 
agrees to the firm’s debt restructuring but he may make a substantial loss on his bond holdings. 
That investor might be better off to resist the restructuring and see the firm file for bankruptcy, in 
which  case  the  CDS  would  compensate  the  investor  for  his  loss.  An  investor  who  bought 
protection might even find it optimal to buy enough bonds to block a restructuring.   
If  CDS  are  functionally  equivalent  to  insurance  contracts,  would  we  be  better  off  if  all 
insurance contracts traded, or is it that CDS should not trade because insurance contracts typically 
do not? Valuable information about a firm’s credit risk can be produced through trading in the 
CDS  market.  No  such  information  would  be  produced  with  trading  on  somebody’s  house 
insurance policy because the financial reward to anybody who finds that the insurance policy is 
mispriced would be trivial. However, there is another fundamental difference between traditional 
insurance and CDS contracts. Insurance companies manage risk through diversification. A large 
portfolio of house insurance policies has close to no risk. Not so for a large portfolio of CDS 
contracts because such a portfolio is sensitive to macroeconomic factors that are not diversifiable. 
Firms are more likely to default in recessions. The ability to trade CDS is therefore a key risk 
management tool for writers of protection to achieve a level of risk that they can be comfortable 
with.  
 
2.  Subprime derivatives  
As  is  now  well-known,  subprime  mortgages  have  significant  default  risk.  As  with  other 
mortgages,  subprime  mortgages  are  securitized,  so  that  the  financial  institutions  originating 
mortgages do not have to keep them on their books.
9 Mortgages are placed in a pool and notes are 
issued against that pool. The  notes issued against the pool, often called tranches, differ in their 
priority in receiving payments from the mortgages. The most senior tranche has a first claim on 
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interest payments and mortgage payoffs among the holders of notes. Many of the notes, and 
generally all of the most senior notes, have a rating from a credit-rating agency. The super-senior 
notes always have an AAA rating. As mortgages default, the lowest rated securities suffer first 
from  the  default  losses.  As  default  losses  mount,  it  becomes  possible  for  the  highly  rated 
securities to suffer from default losses as well.  
Consider now AAA rated debt issued against a pool of mortgages. This debt would promise a 
coupon, generally set at a premium above a floating rate such as LIBOR. A financial institution 
could choose to hold that debt. If the financial institution wants to insure that debt, it could do so 
by  purchasing  protection  through  a  CDS.  However,  there  is  a  complication  with  subprime 
securitized debt. The debtholders receive cash flows from the pool of mortgages. These cash 
flows can decline because of defaults on the mortgages that are securitized (or for some other 
reasons).  With  corporate  debt,  default  leads  to  restructuring  or  bankruptcy.  With  securitized 
subprime debt, default on the underlying mortgages leads to a reduction in debt payments and not 
to  bankruptcy.  Because  of  this,  CDS  written on securitized debt  work  differently  from  CDS 
written on corporate debt. Suppose that an investor holds a AAA tranche with a principal amount 
of $100 million and the other tranches of the securitization have been wiped out; further, suppose 
that during a month $1 million of mortgages default so that the principal balance falls from $100 
million to $99 million. At that time, the investor would be paid $1 million from the CDS. The 
CDS would still exist after that payment and would make payments as mortgages default until 
maturity of the contract or, if earlier, until the mortgages in the pool cease to exist. 
Lower-rated tranches from subprime securitizations were often repackaged in the form of 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). With a CDO, debt issues or loans are placed in a pool and 
securities are issued against the pool. One popular type of CDO would put bonds rated BBB in a 
pool and then issue securities against that pool. Despite the fact that the pool had BBB securities, 
it would issue perhaps 70% of securities rated AAA. CDS were written to provide protection to 11 
 
holders of CDOs as well. CDOs are difficult to price, which means that credit-default swaps on 
CDOs are hard to price as well.  
A CDO can be created synthetically. One way to do so is to purchase a portfolio of low risk 
securities, such as treasuries, sell protection against a reference portfolio of subprime mortgages 
and other debt, and issue securities against that portfolio. Buying treasuries and selling protection 
through CDS is approximately equivalent to holding a portfolio of debt. For example, a trust 
could issue securities to buy $1 billion of treasuries and write protection on $1 billion of subprime 
mortgages. Suppose that the value of the subprime mortgages falls because of defaults, so that the 
CDS written by the pool has to make a $100 million payment on the CDS. The trust would sell 
$100 million of treasuries to fund that payment. The value of the trust is closely related to the 
value of an investment of $1 billion in subprime mortgages. With this approach, CDOs can be 
created  synthetically  by  issuing  securities  against  a  portfolio  of  treasuries  and  short  CDS 
positions. With a synthetic CDO, credit losses hurt the investors in the CDO and benefit the 
writers of the CDS. On net, there is no loss – it is only wealth redistribution.  
In  2006,  indices  of  CDS on  subprime  securitizations  were  introduced.  These  indices  are 
called the ABX indices.   They represent a basket of CDS contracts on securitized subprime 
mortgages. When subprime origination was active, ABX indices were created every six months. 
An index would be based on an average of CDS for same seniority securitization tranches. For 
instance, the AAA index for 2007-1 was based on an average of individual CDS on the largest 
AAA-rated  securitization tranches issued in the  second  half  of  2006. The  index  level  would 
behave like a bond price – as the risks of default losses increase, its level would fall. In 2007, 
these indices fell sharply, reflecting a loss in value of subprime securities.  
 The  ABX  indices  made  it  possible  for  investors  to  take  views  on  the  subprime  market 
without  owning  subprime  mortgages  directly  or  indirectly.  Investors  could  purchase  or  sell 
insurance on the ABX indices. As a result, it was possible for investors to take more exposure to 
subprime  mortgages  than  there  were such  mortgages.  Data  on  subprime  CDS  positions  only 12 
 
became  available  late  in  the  fall  of  2008  through  the  DTCC  data  warehouse.  This  data  is 
incomplete. The DTCC estimated that less than 1% of the CDS registered with it were CDS 
contracts involving the ABX – in other words a notional amount of less than $330 billion – as of 
early November. It is possible that the size of the subprime CDS market was much larger because 
not all contracts are registered with the DTCC, because many contracts may have been unwound 
by the time the DTCC started reporting contracts, and perhaps because there were many contracts 
on subprime that did not use the ABX indices.  
Subprime CDS provided investors with the ability to go short on subprime securities and to 
hedge such securities. Both benefits should have been valuable. The price discovery provided by 
the ABX indices was valuable since it helped financial institutions and investors assess the value 
of  subprime  securities.
10  However, it is not clear how good that price discovery was.  Many 
observers argue that  at times  price movements in  the ABX indices  overreacted to changes in 
expected default losses on subprime mortgages – in fact, Stanton and Wallace (2009) provide 
evidence that for some of these indices at some times the implied probabilities of default on the 
underlying mortgages were greater than 1.
11 The hedging benefit of CDS should ha ve made it 
possible for subprime risk to be located with those investors and institutions for wh ich bearing 
such risk was most valuable.  
Large providers of protection on subprime risks were various insurance companies. Monoline 
insurance companies  are specialized insurance companies that insure debt. Historically, they 
mostly insured municipal bonds. As the subprime securitization market grew, monolines became 
more  and  more  active  in  providing  insurance  on  the  higher  rated  tranches  in  subprime 
securitizations. They acquired extremely large subprime exposures this way. As we will discuss 
extensively later, AIG also insured much debt with subprime collateral.  Unfortunately, some of 
the hedging benefit turned out to be illusory because parties providing the he dging did not have 
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the ability to bear the risk ex post and the risk these parties were bearing led some of them to be 
bailed out.  
 
3.  The size of the CDS market 
Because CDS are traded over-the-counter and are not regulated, there is no official record of 
CDS contracts. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has statistics on the CDS market 
only since the end of 2004 based on survey data.
12 By then, the CDS market had been alive for 
roughly ten years, but its size in the 1990s was trivial  – an estimate for 1998 is that at that time 
the size of the market was $180 billion.
13 By 2004, the total notional amount was $6 trillion. At 
the end of June 2008, the size of the market, at $57 trillion, was almost ten times bigger. 
However, the size of the market fell sharply in the second half of 2008.
14 The BIS reported that 
the size of the credit default swap market at the end of 2008 was $41 trillion.  When the  BIS 
started keeping track of CDS contracts, single-name contracts were 80% of the market; at the end 
of June  2008, these single-name contracts were only 58% of the market.  Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of the size of the CDS market. 
All major dealers register their plain vanilla credit default swaps with the DTCC warehouse. 
The size of the market as measured by the CDS registered with the DTCC is much smaller, $29 
trillion on May 22, 2009. With the registry, the DTCC can make sure it counts each CDS contract 
only once. It is harder to make sure of that with surveys, so it is possible that surveys inflate the 
size of the market, but since not all contracts are registered with the DTCC, the DTCC under -
estimates the size of the market to some extent.  Of the $29 trillion of default swaps registered 
with the DTCC on May 22, 2009, $15 trillion were single-name swaps.  
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There is no net outstanding supply of credit default swaps. For each buyer of protection, there 
is a seller of protection. From that perspective, the total market value of the outstanding CDS is 
zero. However, it is also interesting to consider the market value of the protection bought through 
CDS. If protection is bought on a firm that has no significant risk of default, the value of the 
protection  will  be trivially  low  even  if  the  protection  is  bought  on  a large  notional amount. 
However, if a name’s probability of default is close to one and the expected recovery is close to 
zero, the value of the protection bought is close to the notional amount of the swap. As with all 
derivatives, there is a dramatic difference between the total notional amount outstanding and the 
market value of the contracts outstanding for CDS. The BIS survey estimates the market value of 
the  contracts  outstanding  at  $5.6  trillion  at  the  end  of  December  2008.  Figure  2  shows  the 
evolution  of  the  market  value  of  the  contracts  from  2004  to  the  end  of  2008.  A  striking 
development that took place in 2008 is that the CDS market size fell when measured using the 
total notional amount of credit swaps, but it increased sharply when measured using the market 
value of the outstanding swaps. At the end of December 2007, the market value of the swaps was 
$2 trillion, so that the size of the market almost tripled using market values. Such an evolution is 
not surprising because default risks increased for many companies in 2008.  
 
4.  CDS, over-the-counter markets, and exchanges 
To understand the benefits and costs of over-the-counter (OTC) trading for CDS, it is best to 
start with a simple example. Suppose that you are a hedge fund manager and are pessimistic 
about the future of the credit of bank holding company X. A simple way to express your view is 
to buy protection on bank X through a five-year credit default swap. To enter the swap, you call 
up dealers to obtain quotes. You might call Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and Natixis because 
you typically deal with them. Say Natixis offers the best deal and you take it. You then agree to 
make regular payments, say quarterly, at an annual rate of 100 basis points on a notional amount 
of $10 million. Until April of this year, when you entered the CDS, the CDS was priced so that 15 
 
the market’s assessment of the present value of the payments the buyer of protection expected to 
make roughly equaled the present value of the payment he expected to receive in the event of a 
default of bank X. In other words, the terms of the CDS were set so that it had no economic value 
from the market’s perspective at inception – if you sold the contract one second after you entered 
it, you got nothing for selling it. Since April 2009, CDS contracts initiated in North America have 
a fixed payment of either 100 basis points or 500 basis points per year.
15 If the net present value 
of the protection you receive on company X is positive when you pay 100 basis points per year, 
then you have to make an initial payment to the seller of protection c orresponding to that net 
present value.  
Immediately after you enter the swap,  Natixis has an exposure to  bank X. Should bank X 
default and the bonds of bank X become worth 40 cents on the dollar, Natixis would  have to pay 
$6 million. Derivatives dealers a re in the business of making markets for derivatives, not of 
taking exposures to the credit risk of companies. Natixis would therefore immediately look for 
ways to hedge or transfer its exposure. Most likely, Natixis would buy protection on bank X from 
some other dealer, say UBS, who might also turn around and buy protection, say from Goldman 
Sachs. However, eventually, somebody has to bear the risk from the credit default swap you 
entered. Suppose that another hedge fund, Contrarian, want s to sell protection on bank X and 
agrees to sell protection on bank X to Goldman Sachs. Contrarian would hold a position that is 
the opposite of the one you have.   
With this example, in a sense you buy protection on bank X from Contrarian. However, three 
intermediaries make this happen, namely Natixis, UBS, and Goldman Sachs, and you will never 
know that Contrarian is the ultimate seller of protection. There is a whole chain of credit default 
swap between you and the end -user who has the opposite position. More specificall y, in this 
example, there are four CDS of $10 million notional each.  The size of  the OTC market for 
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derivatives is increased by the fact that after an end-user has entered a derivatives position, a 
search process starts which ends when a party is identified who is willing to hold the opposite 
position.  
So, you made a phone call, or exchanged electronic messages, and agreed to terms to enter a 
CDS contract with Natixis.
16 Now, the trade has to clear, which means that both you and Natixis 
have to formally ratify the agreement you made so that everybody involved agrees to the rights 
and obligations you acquired through your phone call. The trader at Natixis will be off to other 
trades immediately after talking to you. Back offices now get involved.  First, the back office at 
Natixis captures the trade  – it records it. Second, it verifies it with your back office. However, 
when the back office from Natixis contacts your back office, they might think that they have a 
contract on $20 million notional instead of $10 million notional. At that time, this disagreement 
would have to be resolved. Third, the trade is confirmed after possible disagreements have been 
resolved. The clearing process for derivatives consists of all the steps that take place from the 
trade  completion  to  the  settlement.  The  settlement  is  when  a  party  receives  cash  from  the 
counterparty to fulfill the obligation agreed to through the trade.  
It should be immediately clear that a disorganized clearing process can create substantial risk. 
Suppose that for whatever reason confirmation does not take place. It could be that the back 
office of Natixis was too busy and forgot, or that the trader forgot to inform the back office 
properly. However, the trade with UBS was cleared properly. In this case, Natixis might have 
hedged a position that it might not have because the trade was never confirmed. Instead of having 
no exposure, it would now have a risky CDS contract on its books.  
After you enter the contract, its life might be just as you expected when you entered the 
contract. Perhaps you had decided to hold on to the contract until either bank X defaults or the 
CDS matures. If bank X defaults, Natixis makes the promised payment. Throughout the life of the 
contract, you are never concerned about Natixis’ ability to honor the promise it made to you.  
                                                            
16 There are also some fully automated platforms on which you could trade.  17 
 
What about a less run-of-the mill outcome? Two such outcomes are interesting. First, after 
some time, you could decide that you don’t want to hold the contract to maturity. I call this case 
the exit case. Second, the financial situation of Natixis could deteriorate so that the market might 
become concerned about its ability to honor its promises. I call this the counterparty risk case. 
Consider first the exit case. There are at least three ways to exit a CDS position. First, you 
could go to Natixis and negotiate terms under which the CDS agreement would be terminated. If 
the credit of bank X deteriorated since the inception of the swap, the swap became more valuable 
to you because it became more likely that Natixis would have to make a payment as a result of a 
default of bank X. In this case, you would receive a payment from Natixis upon termination. 
Alternatively, if the credit of bank X improved, you would have to make a payment to Natixis. 
Second, you could enter a contract to sell protection on bank X for the same notional amount as 
your contract with Natixis with some other dealer that matures when your CDS matures. In this 
case, assuming that there is no uncertainty about whether the dealers will honor their promises, 
the two CDS you have essentially offset each other and you are no longer exposed to the credit 
risk of bank X. Third, you could go to a dealer and enter an agreement that this dealer will take on 
your obligation to Natixis. Such an agreement is called a novation.  
If you went back to Natixis to reach an agreement to terminate the contract, it would be a 
bilateral negotiation. Natixis might not offer you favorable terms because if it agreed it would 
have to find a way to offset the CDS it entered into to offset your swap. Natixis might also feel 
that it has some market power. It might charge a termination fee. Entering an offsetting swap is 
simple, but you still have some risk since the new swap counterparty might default and then you 
will still have your original swap. Novation can eliminate all your risk. However, somebody else 
has to assume the counterparty risk – and, at times, may require to be paid for that.   
With novation, it is important for Natixis to know that the counterparty has changed and to 
agree to the change. Natixis might be concerned about its exposure to the new dealer and might 
refuse the novation. A sign that Bear Stearns’ situation was desperate was when counterparties to 18 
 
Bear Stearns wanted to novate their trades and eventually they could not find dealers willing to 
novate.
17 Again, the role of the back office is crucial here. Suppose that you thought you had 
novated the contract, but Natixis never agreed. In this case, you would still be the purchaser of 
protection from Natixis’ perspective. However, the situation would be troublesome for the dealer 
with  whom  you  novated  the  swap.  That  dealer  might  have  thought  it  had  a  swap  buying 
protection on bank X when it did not.  
As we saw, the market for CDS grew very quickly and became enormous. Not surprisingly, 
this growth was accompanied by growing pains. Traders want to trade and often worry little about 
whether the back office follows. Back offices are not prestigious. They are hidden. Banks may lag 
in staffing back offices for new types of derivatives. Not surprisingly, as the market’s growth 
accelerated,  back  offices  often  did  not  follow.  For  instance,  in  2004,  according  to  an  ISDA 
survey,  the  average  time  to  confirmation  for  a  credit  derivative  was  25  days.
18  There was 
uncertainty as to the status of default swaps. A few years back, it might have taken  a couple of 
weeks for Natixis to be informed of the novation, and sometimes these communications fell 
through the cracks. The New York Fed worked hard to get the industry to solve these  problems 
and had significant success. Nevertheless, after Bear Stearns was acquired by JPMorgan Chase, 
its new owners discovered a large amount of unconfirmed CDS.
19 However, according to ISDA 
(2009), at this time, 92% of confirmations for credit derivatives are done electronically. Of these 
confirmations, more than 60% are done the same day and more than 90% within a day.    
Let’s now look at the case of counterparty risk. Suppose that you just entered the swap and 
Natixis files for bankruptcy or is simply closed by regulators. In this case, the swap would have 
no value because you just entered it. To re-establish your position, you would have to enter the 
same swap with somebody else. If nothing changed due to the bankruptcy, you would do so on 
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a trade in March 2008 for a hedge fund that had Bear Stearns as a counterparty.  
18 Ledrut and Upper (2007) review some of the evidence on backlogs.  
19 See Tett (2009), p. 224. 19 
 
terms similar to those that prevailed before the bankruptcy. You would still make a loss that you 
would want to be compensated for because you would incur transaction costs. However, it could 
be that the Natixis bankruptcy disrupts markets. In this case, the market might lack liquidity, so 
that  you  would  have to agree  to  less  favorable  terms  to  re-establish the  swap,  which  would 
increase the replacement cost  for  you  beyond the  cost implied  by  the bid-ask  spread. These 
replacement costs would be magnified if the position you seek to replace is larger than a standard 
size position.   
What if Natixis fails after some time? In this case, the impact of the failure on your CDS 
position depends on whether you gained from the swap or lost. If Natixis fails, the swap is 
terminated. If bank X’s credit worsened, you gained on your swap. Your gain is at risk in the 
event of termination. If bank X’s credit improved, most likely you will owe to the bankruptcy 
estate of Natixis. Irrespective of whether you gained or lost, the precise quantification of the gain 
or loss can be complicated because termination of the swap leaves you in a different situation 
from the one you were in before the termination. To be in the same situation as you were in 
before the termination, you would have to replace the swap which would involve costs that you 
would want to be compensated for by Natixis.  
   A well-established solution to address the issue of counterparty risk is a bilateral mark-to-
market and collateral agreement. With such an agreement, the counterparty whose position in the 
swap has negative value has to post collateral based on the market value of the swap. As the 
market value of the swap falls further, the party has to post more collateral. Consider the case of 
your swap on bank X. Suppose that the value of the protection you bought is now $2 million. 
With a collateral agreement, Natixis might have to post collateral worth $2 million. With this 
agreement, you would lose nothing if you could turn around immediately after the failure of 
Natixis and enter the same swap for $2 million. However, the failure of Natixis could have made 
the markets dysfunctional and you might not be able to replace the swap at all for some time or 
only at a cost much higher than $2 million. In this case, despite the existence of a collateral 20 
 
agreement, you could make a large loss because of the failure of Natixis.  You would have a 
claim against the bankruptcy estate of Natixis if you suffered a loss in excess of the collateral you 
had in your possession. If you had multiple swap positions with Natixis, the positions would be 
netted against each other if they were made under the same contractual framework (the same 
master agreement), so that you would owe Natixis the net amount or you would be owed the net 
amount.  
How  would  your  trade  in  the  CDS  have  worked  differently  had  the  CDS  traded  on  an 
exchange? Derivatives are standardized on exchanges. Consequently, you would have had to 
choose a contract that is available on an exchange. You would have placed an order with a broker 
to open a CDS position. On the exchange, your trade would have taken place when somebody 
else would have been willing to take the opposite position. However, in contrast to the OTC 
market,  your  counterparty  would  not  be  a  dealer,  but  it  would  be  the  clearinghouse  of  the 
exchange. The exchange clearinghouse clears all contracts traded on the exchange and serves as 
the  counterparty.  The  promise  of  your  CDS  contract  would  be  honored  as  long  as  the 
clearinghouse has the resources to do so. The ability of the clearinghouse to honor the promises 
of  the  contracts  it  clears  depends  on  its  resources,  including  its  capital,  and  on  its  risk 
management. Clearinghouses use margin agreements to reduce their risk. With these agreements, 
parties to a contract have to put up collateral when they open the contract. This collateral is called 
the initial margin. Each day, the contract is marked to market and the mark-to-market gains and 
losses are settled. Through judicious use of margin levels, a clearinghouse can make its risk of 
default low – if the margin were 100% of the notional amount of a credit default swap there 
would be no risk of default for the clearinghouse. As long as a day’s loss on a contract is less than 
the margin, the clearinghouse can make up the loss by holding on to the collateral. There would 
be no chain of contracts if the contracts are traded on exchanges. Trade prices on exchanges are 
publicly  available,  so  that  there  is  transparency.  In  addition,  regulators  could  identify  the 
counterparties to trades through the clearinghouse should they have a need to do so.   21 
 
 
5.  Counterparty risks, the credit-default swap market, and the crisis    
Though it is common to hear that CDS contributed significantly to the crisis, it is important to 
understand that in many ways the CDS market worked remarkably well during the credit crisis. 
According to participants, much of the market for CDS remained fairly liquid for at least the first 
year of the credit crisis – i.e, from late July 2007 to late July 2008. Further, the market handled 
extremely large defaults well organizationally. A good example is how well it processed the 
default of Lehman. The notional amount of protection bought on Lehman is unclear. Different 
estimates have been circulating, ranging from $72 billion to $400 billion for the total notional 
amount of CDS written on Lehman.
20 However, one estimate is unquestionable: the DTCC had 
contracts on Lehman for a notional amount of $72 billion registered in its warehouse.  Protection 
sellers had to pay 91.375 cen ts on the dollar to settle the contracts.  The settlement for these 
contracts went smoothly. Importantly, the net exchanges of cash for Lehman, despite the wild 
rumors in the markets, were rather small: $ 5.2 billion were exchanged through the DTCC. The 
net amounts were small because many institutions were both buyers and sellers of protection on 
Lehman, so that their net position was small.  As mentioned before regarding the DTCC, not all 
contracts are registered through the DTCC, so that additional contracts   referencing Lehman 
existed, but we cannot know the total notional amount of these contracts.  
If the CDS market worked well, why is it considered to have been so dangerous?  Though 
financial crises keep occurring, it is not uncommon for the recent financia l innovations to be 
blamed and for legislation to ban them. The crash of one of the first famous bubbles, the South 
Sea Bubble in 1720, was followed by a ban on joint stock companies in 1720 and by the Barnard 
Act in 1734 that banned option trading. Howeve r, there were problems with CDS exposures 
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during the crisis. One problem is that while collateral arrangements were frequent, they were not 
universal.  According  to  an  ISDA  survey,  63%  of  derivatives  contracts  were  subject  to  such 
agreements in 2007, compared to 30% in 2003. When a dealer defaults on swaps not covered by 
collateral agreements, the counterparties can make large losses.  
Another major reason for concerns about the CDS market is the size of gross exposures of 
dealers. In 2008, the CDS contracts outstanding of JP Morgan Chase had a notional amount of 
almost $8 trillion, and those of Citi, almost $3 trillion. Investment banks did not provide as much 
information about their derivatives exposures, but it was estimated that the CDS of Bear Stearns 
amounted to a total notional amount of $2.5 trillion.
21  Under normal circumstances, these gross 
exposures are not much of a problem. The estimate of the cost to JP Morgan Chase of replacing 
the CDS contracts on which it was owed if counterparties were to def ault, after taking into 
account  bilateral netting  and collateral agreements,  was just $44  billion  at the end of 2008 
according to its  2008 annual report.  To  put  this  amount  in  perspective,  JPMorgan  Chase’s 
shareholder equity at the end of 2008 was $166 billion. However, even that amount may overstate 
the exposure of JP Morgan Chase because it ignores some forms of collateral. The bank does not 
report the impact of netting for credit derivatives separately. However, this impact is large for its 
overall  derivatives  portfolio.  As  of  the  fourth  quarter  of  2008,  the  bank  had  derivatives 
receivables of $2.7 trillion, but after netting this amount was only $266 billion.  
A dealer’s net derivatives receivables could be zero and the dealer might still pose significant 
risks to the financial system. Consider a dealer who hedges all CDS on its books through matched 
trades.  The  dealer  has  $1  trillion  notional  of  protection  bought  and  $1  trillion  notional  of 
protection sold. Effectively, the dealer has $2 trillion of gross exposure. However, the net amount 
is $0. For every swap, there is an offsetting swap on the books. Suppose that all the dealer’s 
contracts have mark-to-market and collateral agreements. Does that mean that there is no risk? A 
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default of this hypothetical dealer still has the potential to create havoc in the financial markets 
for at least five reasons:  
 
1)  Writers of protection on the dealer will make losses. These losses could potentially be 
large even with collateral agreements. With an unexpected default, there is a jump to 
default for the CDS which can lead to a large change in value. To see this, suppose that 
the market expects that there is a 20% chance a dealer will default and the recovery is 
expected to be 40%. Ignoring the time value of money, risk premia, and liquidity effects, 
the value of a $10 million notional CDS for the protection buyer would be $800,000. At 
the default, the value of the CDS would be $6 million. The protection seller would lose 
$5.2 million on the day of default. Such losses could possibly lead to some other dealer 
default if another dealer has a large net exposure as a protection seller on the defaulting 
dealer. Such a situation is not dissimilar to the situation for CDS on Lehman the last 
working day before the bankruptcy filing. On that day, it cost roughly $700,000 to insure 
$10 million of Lehman debt for a year, so that a buyer of protection against Lehman on 
Friday would have earned a huge gain since the swaps paid off more than $9 million on 
settlement. 
2)  Counterparties to the dealer have to replace the CDS they have with the dealer to keep 
their exposures unchanged. This can take time and can be costly, especially if the dealer’s 
collapse renders the market less liquid or even disfunctional. As a result, counterparties to 
the defaulting dealer can be exposed to risks over some period of time, which could lead 
to further defaults and instability. An especially worrisome situation would be one where 
a large financial institution collapses immediately after the dealer’s default. In that case, 
financial institutions that had hedged their counterparty risk to that financial institution 
through the defaulting dealer might be unprotected which could lead to further defaults.  24 
 
3)  Collateral  is  at  times  re-hypothecated.  Re-hypothetication  essentially  means  that  the 
collateral  is  used  as  collateral  by  the  dealer  to  borrow.  A  CDS  counterparty  could 
therefore have its collateral at the dealer, the dealer could have used it to borrow, and 
consequently the collateral would not be held by the dealer at the time of failure. In such 
a  situation,  the  counterparty’s  excess  collateral  might  be  difficult  to  recover,  further 
compounding the uncertainty resulting from the dealer’s failure.  
4)  There is limited transparency about the exposures of dealers to derivatives. As a result, it 
is not possible for counterparties to assess the risk they are exposed to by transacting with 
dealers following a large shock. It can become optimal for individual counterparties to 
stop transacting with a dealer when its financial situation is uncertain, which can lead to a 
run on the dealer and gridlock in the financial system.  
5)  Failure of a financial institution can lead to contagion. With contagion, investors become 
concerned about the credit risk associated with other financial institutions. This contagion 
can lead to large changes in the value of credit default swaps. Such contagion can be 
created by uncertainty about CDS exposures of financial institutions.   
 
In the OTC market, dealers typically have balanced books. There will be a balance of gains 
and losses resulting from a dealer failure. Collateral will protect the parties who had made gains 
before the failure. In normal times, we would expect all parties to replace the swaps they had, so 
that there will be some balance in the markets between parties trying to buy protection and parties 
trying  to  sell  protection.  In  an  orderly  and  well-functioning  market,  we  would  expect  these 
opposite parties to find each other and make deals to replace the contracts they had with the failed 
dealer. However, in more turbulent times, this process will not evolve smoothly. To understand 
this, remember that when a party wants to enter a CDS contract, a dealer typically accommodates 
that party but with the intention of immediately offsetting the trade so that the dealer has no 
exposure. When markets function poorly, the dealer cannot have that expectation and may be 25 
 
extremely reluctant to make a market. As a result, it may be harder and more expensive to find 
replacement  contracts  than  usual.  The  dealer’s  failure  could  lead  to  a  situation  where  some 
counterparties, including other dealers, become unhedged and vulnerable to further shocks. In 
addition, counterparties could make losses because of changes in the market value of contracts 
since the last posting of collateral.   
With  a dealer  failure,  the  losses on  CDS  from  the  dealer’s counterparties  net  out  in  the 
economy when the dealer has a matched book except for deadweight costs. Consider the simple 
case where A bought protection on X from the defaulting dealer and B sold protection on X to the 
defaulting dealer. A has made gains on the contract but is protected with collateral. If the dealer 
fails, on net, the gain of A is the loss of B except for deadweight losses. Large deadweight losses 
can arise because of potential difficulties and costs in replacing hedges and because of the costs 
of dealing with the bankruptcy estate for the two counterparties. For instance, with chaos in the 
markets, neither A nor B could find replacement swaps quickly and A being unhedged might fail 
as a result.  
Though Lehman was a big CDS dealer, CDS were not the cause of Lehman’s failure. Neither 
were they the direct cause of Bear Stearn’s demise. Exposure to CDS played a big role in AIG’s 
failure, but AIG made even larger losses on its portfolio of securities. AIG did not behave like a 
dealer. It did not run a matched book. It did not appear to hedge. What AIG did was provide 
credit insurance on AAA tranches in securitizations – on an extremely large scale. As of June 30, 
2008, it had written a net amount of $411 billion notional of credit derivatives on super senior 
tranches of securitizations. Included among these credit derivatives were derivatives on super-
senior tranches of CDOs with subprime collateral for a notional amount of $55.1 billion. At the 
time that AIG wrote the credit protection, all the CDO tranches were rated AAA. The probability 
of a default on an AAA-rated obligation is in principle extremely small, less than 0.1% per year, 
so that AIG – and the regulator of the subsidiary that wrote the protection, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision  –  could  reasonably  think  that  there  was  little  risk  in  selling  protection  on  such 26 
 
tranches. For instance, Moody’s estimated in 2008 that the probability of a default on AAA-rated 
corporate debt over five years to be 0.09% using data from 1970 to 2007 (Moody’s (2008)).
22 In 
almost all possible states of the world, the AAA tranches of CDOs with substantial subprime 
collateral would not have defaulted. However, they did have a significant probability of default in 
what appeared to be an exceedingly low probability outcome based on historical data, namely a 
major downturn in the housing market throughout the U.S.  As such a downturn happened, these 
tranches lost substantial amounts of value. By October 10, 2008, the value of these super-senior 
tranches was $36.2 billion and the value of the super-senior tranches still rated AAA was only 
$16.4 billion. As a result, the value of the credit default swap liability of AIG became very large 
when  marked  to  market.  The  insured  assets  were  held  by  banks  across  the  world.  AIG’s 
agreements required the posting of collateral following a decrease in its credit rating and the 
collateral requirements were more stringent as its credit rating fell more. As the value of the 
securities fell, AIG made more losses. By August 2008, AIG had a total amount of unrealized 
losses on its credit default swaps of $26.2 billion and had posted collateral worth $16.5 billion. In 
addition to its losses on CDS, AIG also made large losses related to subprime and other fixed-
income  securities  involving  securitizations.  Impairments  on  AIG’s  investment  portfolio  as  of 
September 30, 2008, amounted to $32 billion, an amount exceeding the mark-to-market losses on 
its credit default swaps.  
On September 15, credit default swaps on AIG were priced so that to insure $10 million of 
debt  for  five  years,  the  buyer  of  protection  had  to  pay  $2.5  million  upfront  plus  $500,000 
annually. On September 16, after having been downgraded by S&P and Moody’s, AIG had to 
post $14.5 billion additional collateral. It could not meet these collateral requirements without a 
bailout. Had it not posted collateral, it would have been in default. A collapse of AIG would not 
have been a benign event for the markets. However, it is not at all clear that the biggest problem 
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associated with this collapse would have been the default on the CDS. AIG would also have 
defaulted on its debt and its commercial paper at a time when there already was a run on money 
markets. Such an outcome would have been disastrous compared to the impact of default on 
CDS.  
The CDS counterparties of AIG would have made losses, but they also were protected by 
collateral and some had bought protection on AIG. Most if not all of these counterparties were 
financial  institutions.  Financial  institutions  have  to  hold  capital  to  meet  regulations.  They 
generally view holding regulatory capital to be costly to their shareholders. Because of the way 
capital  requirements  are  determined,  financial  institutions  generally  were  able  to  hold  less 
regulatory capital if they packaged loans in securities and held them on their balance sheet than if 
they just kept the loans on their balance sheet.
23 Further, some financial institutions apparently 
believed that it was quite advantageous for them to hold super -senior tranches of securitizations 
on their books if they insured them with CDS. There was therefore a large demand for insurance 
of super-senior tranches that was partly met by AIG.   Regulators across  countries allowed 
financial institutions to set aside less capital because these institutions had bought protection with 
AIG. Had AIG collapsed, these financial institutions would have made losses on their  hedged 
holdings of AAA securities to the extent that they were insufficiently protected by collateral and 
by protection bought against a default from AIG. In addition, these institutions might have found 
it impossible to replace the insurance provided by AIG and, as a result, would have been less well 
capitalized. As these institutions became less well capitalized, they might have needed to reduce 
the loans they made and to raise new capital.  
Importantly, however, the starting point for all that demand for insurance of securitized debt 
was  the fact that t he securities  had an AAA ratings  and that financial institutions in some 
jurisdictions received regulatory capital relief  (the extent of which varied across jurisdictions) 
from holding securitizations tranches with an AAA rating and hedging them with CDS . With 
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such a rating, the securities were viewed as having low risk of default. The fair value of the 
securities fell sharply, but some of that decrease may have had nothing to do with the increase in 
the  risk  of  default  or  with  actual  defaults.  Rather,  that  value  may  have  fallen  because  the 
securities became less liquid and investors required a larger risk premium to hold them. However, 
AIG had to put up collateral regardless of the reason of the decrease in the value of the securities. 
This was a situation totally different from the situation AIG would have faced in its insurance 
business:  if  a  hurricane  moves  away  from  the  coast  at  the  last  minute,  so  that  there  is  no 
destruction, the insurance company pays nothing. If the value of the securities decreased more 
than warranted by the increase in the expected default losses, AIG could expect to receive some 
of the collateral back later as market conditions returned to normal. In the meantime, however, 
AIG did not have the cash to put up collateral.  
 
6.  Are there benefits to OTC trading? 
An observer has argued that “Without OTC derivatives, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and 
American International Group (NYS: AIG) would never have failed.”
24 Many espouse such a 
view. We discussed extensively the case of AIG in the previous section. Both Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers failed because market participants, rightly or wrongly at the time, believed that 
there  was  a  high  probability  that  the  assets  of  these  institutions  were  worth  less  than  their 
liabilities. Derivatives were not the proximate cause of their collapse. However, it is undoubtedly 
true that without derivatives, their assets and liabilities would have been quite different. From 
listening to the press and to such observers, it almost seems as if exchange trading could remove 
the problem of counterparty risk and create transparency and order in the market for derivatives. 
Why  would  we  not  want,  then,  for  all  derivatives  trading  to  take  place  on  exchanges?  If 
exchange-trading is so beneficial, why don’t derivatives trade exclusively on exchanges? 
                                                            
24 “Kabuki on the Potomac: Reforming credit default swaps and OTC derivatives,” Chris Whalen, The 
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Derivatives have been around for centuries. However, the most successful derivatives trading 
today are relatively new. The first interest-rate swap agreement dates of the early 1980s. The first 
CDS  was  introduced  in  1994.  When  these  derivatives  were  introduced,  there  were  long 
negotiations before an agreement was signed. Each new deal took much time and effort. Some 
derivative types have a high volume of trading – some standardized CDS index contracts are 
examples of high trading volume derivatives. Other types of derivatives do not trade. They are 
used to solve specific risk management problems of an end-user. It is easy to innovate over the 
counter. Anybody who thinks that a new type of derivative might solve a one-time problem for a 
single firm can introduce that derivative. No approvals are required except for approvals within 
the firm of the individual who designs the derivative. Innovation on exchanges is much harder. 
Exchanges are regulated and contracts have to be approved by regulators. It only makes sense to 
go through the process of introducing a contract when it can be expected to have a volume high 
enough to justify the expense of getting approvals and setting the exchange up for trading the 
contract.  
The  OTC  market  is  perfect  for  innovation  in  financial  products.  This  explains  why 
derivatives usually start their life on the OTC market rather than on exchanges. However, there is 
a substantial amount of standardization in derivatives trading. As  interest rate swaps became 
better  known,  the  industry  formed  an  association,  the  International  Derivatives  and  Swaps 
Association (ISDA), which devised standardized agreements. When parties trade derivatives, they 
enter a so-called ISDA Master Agreement. The Master Agreement is an ISDA document that has 
many  options  that  the  counterparties  to  derivatives  trades  select  to  form  the  basis  of  the 
contractual agreement they enter into when they trade derivatives. Once the parties have agreed 
on a specific derivatives trade, they use confirmations that are standard ISDA forms. Despite this 
standardization, however, there is an incredible diversity of derivatives contracts. Because the 
market is an OTC market, there are infinite variations of amounts and maturities counterparties 
can choose. They can also choose new forms of derivatives and combine derivatives as they see 30 
 
fit. In contrast, exchanges do not typically let derivatives traders set the terms of the contracts. 
Instead, derivatives traders have a choice of contract terms and cannot depart from these terms.  
Why are exchanges inflexible while the OTC markets are so flexible? If you want to enter a 
derivatives contract, you need to find the counterparty that offers you the best deal. Exchanges 
are places where potential counterparties congregate – sometimes only electronically. As a result, 
if an exchange is successful with a type of derivative, investors and firms interested in taking 
positions in that type of derivative will go to the exchange to achieve their goal. It only makes 
sense to go to the exchange when there is liquidity for the type of derivative you want to trade – 
namely, when you want to trade, a counterparty is available quickly and there is competition 
among  available  counterparties  so  that  you  have  little  impact  on  prices  when  you  trade. 
Exchanges create pools of liquidity by standardization – they have few contract types trading. 
With this standardization, investors and firms give up the opportunity to get a contract that fits 
exactly their needs for the benefit of trading in a liquid contract.  
The OTC market addresses the search process differently.
25 Dealers are available to respond 
to the demand for contracts by investors. Dealers then search for counterparties that will take the 
risk off their hands.  They are organized for that purpose by having traders and sales people 
devoted to the task of selling and buying derivatives. They provide liquidity to end -users by 
taking on positions. Exchanges do not take positions. Any derivative ’s trade on an exchange is 
between counterparties rather than with the exchange; once a trade has taken place, the exchange 
steps between the counterparties in its clearing function.  
Exchanges  offer  a  very  efficient  solution  when  they  succeed  in  drawing  large  pools  of 
liquidity. However, creating such pools for derivatives can be difficult because there is often a 
demand for terms that meet specific hedging needs. Consider a manufacturing firm that wants to 
sell forward its anticipated Euro receipts from exports to Germany. It expects to receive the Euros 
at some known future date. On exchanges, the contracts mature at specific dates. The closest date 
                                                            
25 See Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005).  31 
 
at which a futures contract matures for Euros might be two weeks away and the contract for that 
date may not be very liquid. An OTC dealer could offer a contract that matures on the day that the 
exporter expects to receive the Euros and for the exact number of Euros he expects to receive. 
The exporter might prefer to pay more for the service from the dealer than what he would have to 
pay through the exchange for the benefit of having a contract that exactly meets his needs. In this 
case, the issue is one of maturity, but most hedging demands from end-users can be met at a cost 
on the OTC market irrespective of how specialized they are.  
We saw that a benefit of exchange trading is the existence of a clearing house that becomes 
counterparty to all trades. There is no reason for the use of clearing houses to be restricted to 
exchange trading. Clearing houses are used for some derivatives trades in the over-the-counter 
market. By using a clearing house, the derivatives traders substitute the credit risk of the clearing 
house for the credit risk of the dealer. Regulators have been pushing for the use of clearing houses 
as counterparties for CDS contracts both in the U.S. and in Europe. This effort has had some 
success and it is possible, perhaps even likely, that eventually some types of CDS will have to be 
cleared. Ice Trust, part of the Intercontinental Exchange, started clearing CDS index contracts in 
March 2009. By August 2009, the open interest on contracts cleared through Ice Trust was in 
excess  of  $180  billion  and  Ice  Trust  had  cleared  more  than  $1  trillion  notional  amount  of 
contracts.    
Use of clearing houses for derivatives trading could decrease the risks posed by derivatives 
exposures for the financial system. There are three reasons for this. First, a clearing house that 
acts as counterparty can diversify and manage risks associated with the failure of individual 
counterparties, so that the failure of an individual counterparty could easily be absorbed as long 
as the clearing house has enough resources. Second, with a clearing house, all of the dealer’s 
exposures in the contracts cleared through the clearing house are netted. If all derivatives traded 
through that clearing house, then the exposure of the clearing house to the dealer would only be 
the net exposure of all of the dealer’s derivatives trades to the clearing house. In contrast, the 32 
 
OTC market only allows netting of contracts with a single counterparty.  A clearing house can 
therefore reduce total counterparty exposure.  With multiple clearinghouses and clearinghouses 
specialized to derivatives types, however, it is possible that the netting that takes place through 
clearinghouses is less than the netting that would take place without clearinghouses.
26 Third, a 
clearing house can monitor the exposures of its counterparties and prevent counterparties from 
taking additional exposures.  
The use of a clearinghouse is not a magic bullet  to eliminate systemic risk associated with 
OTC trading of derivatives.
27 A clearinghouse may be at a disadvantage in monitoring  some 
counterparties compared to dealers. A dealer who trades hundred times a day with another dealer 
most likely will  have a better assessment of the credit of that dealer  than a clearinghouse  that 
interacts with the dealer for only one type of derivatives trades would.  The stakes for dealers are 
high because they may have very large intra -day net exposures at times with another d ealer. In 
addition, a clearinghouse is inefficient at dealing with products that are not very liquid. Typically, 
new  financial  products  start  their  lifecycle  with  low  liquidity.  With  such  products,  the 
clearinghouse has to build its own models to evaluate  the risk. Dealers may be better at building 
such models because they devise the products and trade them. A clearinghouse may save costs of 
building models by making  such products ineligible to clear, in which case  the requirement of 
using a clearinghouse would make it impossible to use derivatives that may be quite efficient at 
allocating risk in the economy and would prevent financial innovation.  
Importantly, a clearinghouse resolves counterparty risk only to the extent that it has enough 
resources to draw on to deal with the failure of counterparties. Suppose that a dealer has trades 
booked through a clearinghouse and the dealer fails. If the net position is small, the clearinghouse 
will have no problem dealing with the failure. However, the resources of U.S. clearinghouses are 
limited and they would have been strained by the ongoing  problems of AIG. For instance, CME 
                                                            
26 See Duffie and Zhu (2009).  
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Clearing, the largest futures clearing house in the U.S., can draw on resources of $64 billion to 
cope with failures.  The taxpayer bailout of AIG is a multiple of that amount. The CDS that AIG 
wrote were highly specialized, so that most likely it would not have been feasible for a clearing 
house to become a counterparty to such derivatives. As a result, unless there had been a ban on 
CDS  not  cleared  through  a  central  counterparty,  the  problems  of  AIG  would  not  have  been 
avoided by the availability of a clearing house.  
In  summary,  the  OTC  market  is  better  at  enabling  innovation,  at  addressing  specific 
derivatives  requirements  from  end-users,  and  at  finding  counterparties  when  liquidity  for  a 
derivative on an exchange would be low. In contrast, exchanges are more efficient when there is a 
large  volume  of trading  for  standardized  contracts.  The  OTC  market  can compete  well  with 
exchanges precisely because of this customization. There is a huge OTC forward currency market 
– a market for the purchase of foreign currencies for future delivery. There is a large parallel 
current futures market on exchanges which offers similar contracts. The forward and futures 
currency markets have lived side-by-side for more than thirty years.  
 
7.  Transparency, instability, and manipulation  
With OTC trading, the trades are not public. There can be derivatives trades that almost 
nobody will ever know about. This lack of transparency can create problems. To start with, it 
means  that  exposures  to  derivatives  are  not  well-known.  Financial  institutions  have  some 
disclosures  for  derivatives.  However,  as  evidenced  following  the  Lehman  bankruptcy,  these 
disclosures do not make it possible to assess precisely the vulnerability of a financial institution to 
a dealer default. Lack of understanding of such vulnerability can lead to runs on institutions and 
hence  to  instability.  Yet,  it  would  not  be  in  the  interests  of  financial  institutions  to  be  too 
transparent about their derivatives positions. Such transparency could make it difficult for an 
institution to trade or to take advantage of its views on the market. It was clear in 2008 that 
regulators had an insufficient understanding of dealers’ derivatives exposures and that a better 34 
 
understanding  would  have  been  beneficial.  Information  available  to  regulators  need  not  be 
available to the general public. Consequently, the issue of transparency for regulators is distinct 
from the issue of transparency to investors.  
Lack of transparency for investors means that it is at times difficult for them to know whether 
they are taken advantage of in a transaction. This concern was important to the SEC for bonds 
and  the  SEC  mandated  the  introduction  of  a  system  called  TRACE  where  trade  prices  are 
reported.  Empirical  evidence  shows  that  TRACE  reduced  trading  costs  for  retail  investors.
28 
Retail investors are not important in the  OTC derivatives markets. Institutional investors should 
be able to fend for themselves. If they can’t, they should not be dealing in derivatives over the 
counter. It is therefore not clear that transparency for investors is valuable in the OTC derivatives 
markets. There is an optimal level of transparency in a market. There is considerable transparency 
for some types of derivatives and very little for others. End-users would certainly choose lower 
trading costs if, with lower trading costs, they still had the same choice of derivatives. However, 
the almost infinite menu of derivatives available to end-users may not be consistent with a market 
with trade transparency. Less choice in derivatives forces end-user hedgers to bear more risk 
because they are less likely to be able to take a position in a derivative that exactly matches their 
needs. The fact that derivatives trade on OTC markets in derivatives that are similar to exchange-
traded derivatives is clear evidence that standardization has costs for end-users.  
 In the fall of 2008, many executives were complaining that the market for CDS was being 
manipulated so that increases in CDS premiums created panic and drove down stock prices. 
There were extreme movements in CDS premiums, but in troubled times it can be difficult to 
assess  whether  such  extreme  movements  are  irrational  or  reflect  actual  changes  in  default 
probabilities and recovery estimates. At times, the cost of insuring Morgan Stanley’s debt was in 
excess of 1,500 basis points per year (in other words, to insure $100 principal amount of debt, 
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you would have to pay $15 per year).
29 The argument that there was manipulation  only made 
sense to the extent that data on CDS premiums was public and widely followed.  However, 
information reported about CDS premiums does not indicate how deep the market is. It is hard, if 
not impossible, to successfully manipulate a liquid market through trading. If the market for CDS 
on a name is not highly liquid at a point in time, however, that market could be manipulated, in 
that small trades could move prices.
 Usually, such manipulation might not be profitable because if 
the  market  is  not  liquid  it  is  difficult  to  establish  large  positions  to  take  advantage  of  the 
manipulation. With  CDS,  however,  the  manipulator might  be  able to  benefit by  establishing 
positions in the name’s stock and debt. Hence, few well-placed trades in the name’s CDS could 
give the impression that the name is in trouble, which would drive down the name’s stock price 
and debt prices. The manipulator could then benefit by having established short stock and debt 
positions. It would make sense that financial institutions could be especially vulnerable to such 
actions because they are susceptible to runs.  
So far, despite all the talk of manipulation, the SEC has filed no action on manipulation. This 
may mean that there is no evidence. But it could also mean that, because of the lack of trade 
reporting, it is too difficult to find such evidence. Again, however, it is important to separate 
transparency  to  regulators  from  transparency  to  the  public.  Regulators  can  only  investigate 
manipulation if they can find who traded what and when. Trade reporting could also help in 
identify potential insider trading, as there is evidence in the literature that investors at times can 
use the CDS market to exploit insider information.
30 
Exchanges of information, including text messages, among CDS traders have been viewed 
with suspicion. However, the fact that traders in CDS exchange a lot of information during the 
day is not evidence of manipulation. Dealer markets work through traders talking to ea ch other. 
                                                            
29 Even firms like Berkshire Hathaway have experienced sharp increases in the cost of protection – from 
early September to mid-November 2008, the cost of insuring Berkshire Hathaway’s debt increased from 
140 basis points a year to 415 basis points a year, apparently on rumors that a derivatives bet could turn out 
to be hugely expensive. 
30 See Acharya and Johnson (2007). 36 
 
That is partly how liquidity is created. Traders who attempt to manipulate the market can be 
punished by the traders who then refuse to trade with them or exchange information with them.  
The chairman of the SEC and others have expressed concerns about naked positions in CDS – 
i.e., situations where an investor buys protection without owning bonds issued by the name – 
because they enable investors to effectively sell debt short and, presumably, to push debt prices to 
levels not justified by fundamentals.
31 As already discussed, the ability to sell short can make 
markets more efficient. However, it is also possible that at times the ability to sell short can make 
markets inefficient, perhaps through the manipulation discussed earlier. Though it is ge nerally 
believed among financial economists that restrictions to trade in assets and derivatives hurt 
efficiency, neither the theoretical case for this belief nor the empirical evidence are  completely 
unambiguous.
32  For instance,  the ability to  trade  CDS at  low cost could make it easier for 
uninformed investors to move prices influenced by sentiment. In crisis periods, well -informed 
investors might be constrained in their ability to deploy capital to correct the impact on prices of 
uninformed investors, so that the ability to take short positions on a firm’s credit through the CDS 
market might actually be destabilizing.
33 Perhaps this kind of mechanism explains that more than 
two months after the failure of Lehman a prominent observer could conclude that “now CDS 
spreads tell us precisely nothing about expected default rates.”
34   
Prohibiting naked positions in  CDS would destroy most of the CDS market. Derivatives 
markets are liquid because of speculators and because of dealers. If a market is reduced to having 
only hedgers, the market cannot be liquid and little hedging takes place. Speculators have to be 
able to trade on either side of a market for there to be trading in that market. Prices cannot be 
efficient if investors who see profit opportunities cannot exploit them. Dealers have to be able to 
                                                            
31 Note that naked positions in CDS have no resemblance to naked short positions in the stock market. 
Naked short positions in the stock market are illegal and are positions where the short-seller fails to deliver 
the stock sold short.   
32 Khanna and Matthews (2009) show conditions under which manipulation through short-sales can 
succeed  and make the market inefficient.  
33 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for an analysis of this issue.  
34 Felix Salmon, “In defense of the CDS market,” Portfolio.com, December 9, 2008.  37 
 
offset their positions to manage their risks. The CDS market would stop being a source of credit 
information and a means of credit hedging if buyers of protection could only do so if they owned 
the underlying bond. There is no evidence I know of which suggests that removing naked buying 
of protection would help the economy any more than attempts to reduce stock short-sales did – 
most likely, once the scientific evidence is in, we will find out that the attempts to reduce short-
sales of stocks hurt the stock market and the economy and worsened the credit crisis.      
 
8.  Conclusion 
Fundamentally, the dramatic problems of the credit crisis were not caused by derivatives. 
Neither Bear Stearns nor Lehman failed because of derivatives. AIG could have made the same 
losses as it made on selling protection on CDOs had it borrowed to buy super-senior tranches of 
CDOs,  believing  that  such  tranches  were  safe,  and  in  fact  it  did.  Investors  and  financial 
institutions  generally  believed  that  ex  ante  AAA  tranches  of  securitization  had  a  very  small 
probability of default. Ex post, it turned out that many AAA tranches unexpectedly lost a lot of 
value. Because these tranches were held in large amounts by levered institutions, the losses on 
these tranches led to knock-on losses, reduced confidence in financial institutions, and made it 
harder for banks to make loans. In all this, derivatives exposures at times increased uncertainty 
about the financial health of some institutions and led to losses at some institutions, but they also 
enabled institutions to hedge and hence to reduce the impact of the fall in subprime securities and 
in other securities. It may well be that more robust derivatives markets in housing would have 
produced useful information for investors that would have changed the evolution of housing 
markets  before  the  crash and  would have  enabled investors  to  hedge  against drops  in  house 
prices.  
Economists have generally believed that derivatives increase economic welfare by facilitating 
risk-sharing among investors, by improving price discovery, and by making the allocation of 
capital more efficient. These arguments apply as well to credit derivatives. However, as we have 38 
 
seen  repeatedly  in  this  paper,  there  are  legitimate  reasons  to  be  concerned  about  potential 
problems that can be created because of exposures to derivatives and because of the trading of 
derivatives. A growing number of financial economists are concerned that these problems were 
not  just  potential  problems  and  that  in  fact  derivatives  did  destabilize  markets.  With  their 
arguments, it is legitimate to ask whether the social benefits of some types of derivatives are large 
enough to offset their costs. It is fair to say that, at this time, while the theoretical literature can be 
used by each side to make its case, there is a dearth of serious empirical studies on the social 
benefits and costs of derivatives that would help in advancing this debate. Without such studies, it 
will be more difficult for financial economists who view derivatives to be valuable to convince 
their colleagues – and a large share of the public – that derivatives contribute to social welfare 
and played a positive role in the extraordinary economic growth of the last thirty years.    
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Figure 1. Credit default swaps notional amount outstanding, 2004-2008. 















Figure 2. Market value of credit default swaps outstanding, 2004-2008. 
The data is obtained form the BIS bi-annual derivatives survey. 
 
 